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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to provide a structural review by analysing aspects of the relationship betwe-
en prudential policy and systemic risk. It addresses the current research challenges associated with 
a lack of macro-prudential policy formalisation, guidance regarding its implementation and effecti-
veness measurement. Given the rising levels of interconnectedness between financial markets, the 
paper addresses the potential contagion or spill-over effects that foster change in systemic risk, espe-
cially in the case of market size differences. Finally, the paper discusses challenges associated with 
macro versus micro-prudential policy implementation, addressing difficulties in the measurement of 
systemic risk. 
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Anotacija
Straipsnyje siekiama struktūriškai aptarti riziką ribojančios politikos ir sisteminės rizikos santykių as-
pektus. Aptariamos atliekant tyrimą kilusios problemos, susijusios su formalios makrolygmens riziką 
ribojančios politikos, jos įgyvendinimo gairių ir vertinimo veiksmingumo trūkumu. Atsižvelgiant 
į didėjantį finansų rinkų susietumą, straipsnyje analizuojami galimo rizikos išplitimo ir šalutinio 
poveikio padariniai, galintys lemti tam tikrus sisteminės rizikos pokyčius, ypač esant skirtingo dydžio 
rinkoms. Be to, aptariami iššūkiai, susiję su makro- ir mikroriziką ribojančių politikų įgyvendinimu 
bei sisteminės rizikos įvertinimo sunkumais. 
PAGRINDINIAI ŽODŽIAI: sisteminė rizika, makroriziką ribojanti politika, finansinis stabilumas, 
rizikos plitimas.  
dOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.15181/tbb.v83i2.2061
Introduction
In the last decade, the challenges to financial stability and the origination of 
systemic risk climbed to the top of international policy agendas (Borio, 2003). The 
recent financial crisis further fuelled a significant amount of attention and con-
cern regarding regulatory practices, potentially underlying the need for a different 
approach to financial supervision (Käfer, 2014). 
The concept of financial stability is still heterogeneous, and remains flexible 
even among financial regulators. Traditionally, authors focused on the contrasting 
notion of financial instability, suggesting analysing the origin of contagion, and, 
for example, the origin of bank runs (Sarlin, 2014). More recently, academia and 
policymakers have been refocusing on financial stability, which is widely referred 
to as a feature, or state of a financial system, which comprises the efficient allo-
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cation of resources by managing financial risk, divided by its correctional mecha-
nisms (Apatachioae, 2013). The key features of a financially stable state include 
assisting the improvement of economic performance, and supporting the elimina-
tion of endogenously caused imbalances of unanticipated events (Borio, 2003). As 
the concept implies, the interaction between agents results in financial market sen-
sitivity towards such operations. Financial stability appears to be a highly dynamic 
feature of a financial system, using auto-regulatory mechanisms to recover from its 
non-optimal state (Apatachioae, 2013). 
It is important to note that financial stability does not necessarily lead to an ab-
sence of crises; it rather acts as a complex of mechanisms and processes correcting 
imbalances, and might lead to certain economic costs. As in the extreme example 
proposed by Eichengreen (2004) in discussing the case of China’s tight control 
over its financial markets in order to restrict potential speculation over its currency, 
this policy may have prevented major financial instability, but might have resulted 
in restricted operation in the financial sector that is usually followed by a sharp 
decline in output. 
Given the potential cost of excessive controls on financial development at the 
expense of economic growth, the key to optimal financial policies might be balan-
cing the trade-off between stability and growth. Therefore, mechanisms ensuring 
financial stability should focus on monitoring and preparing for potential down-
turns, reducing the effects of potential costs that a crisis would generate. At the 
same time, the policies put in place would need to allow for controlled risk-taking 
in the economy, to foster financial development and the growth of the financial 
system/markets themselves.
The aim of this paper is to provide a structured review of current research and 
policy challenges associated with analysing the relationship between prudential 
policy and systemic risks in the financial sector. Thus, the remainder of the paper 
pursues the following objectives: 
1. To analyse and present a systematic overview of the effects of prudential po-
licy on systemic risk by defining the differences between micro and macro-
prudential approaches in terms of risk comprehension – chapter 1;
2. To provide a methodological approach to determine macro-prudential poli-
cy and the ways it might affect systemic risk – chapter 2;
3. To highlight the importance of interbank linkages, as an externality that 
might serve as a potential source of contagion/spill-over affecting systemic 
risk – chapter 3;
4. To analyse and discuss the challenges associated with the implementation of 
macro-prudential policy and systemic risk measurement – chapter 4.
The paper finishes with conclusions and comments. 
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1. Systemic risk and prudential policy: a macro versus a micro approach 
Prudential supervision has been reshaped by the entry into force of the Basel III 
regulation. The traditional micro approach has been complemented with a macro-
prudential dimension designed to deal with systemic risk as well. 
However, the definition of macro-prudential policy, as well as its objectives, 
still differs across strands of literature, as it is widely associated with financial 
stability. The common view defines macro-prudential policy as a set of tools and 
processes that try to limit the risks and costs of systemic crises, although the form 
and the extent of the limitation differ (Galati & Moessner, 2011). 
In terms of focus areas, macro-prudential policy concentrates on the whole 
portfolio loss, while micro-prudential policy addresses the loss of each individual 
security, if, to make an analogy, we assume the financial system is a portfolio, and 
the securities represent the corresponding banks (Borio, 2003). 
Finally, these two approaches treat risk differently: macro-prudential policy as-
sumes that risk is endogenous, as institutions as a whole can affect the prices of 
financial assets and quantities. This may consequently impact the overall state of 
the economy, and, in a feedback effect, provide different conditions for institu-
tions individually. On the contrary, a micro-prudential approach would not take a 
feedback effect into consideration, as individually, financial institutions may not 
have significant weight to influence the overall economy. Therefore, this approach 
considers risk to be exogenous to the financial system.
The traditional approach regarding financial policy before the recent financial 
crisis was to focus on micro-prudential supervision, concentrating on the soundness 
of individual financial institutions (Villar, 2017). However, the recent financial tur-
moil underlined the potential limitations of the micro-prudential approach itself, 
even when combined with stable output and inflation (Arslan & Upper, 2017). 
Green et al. (2011) point to a fallacy of composition, where, while the level 
of risk of individual institutions might seem low, the same would not necessarily 
apply to the financial system as a whole. This may occur, as the authors suggest, 
because of the overall concentration in banks’ portfolios of similar investments, 
which increase their exposure to a common risk, even though individually they 
might seem diversified to the desired extent. Similarly, if an individual bank level 
of risk is measured during times of economic expansion, it may consequently lead 
to the omission of imbalances, which, piling up, may create a serious threat in 
times of financial distress. As suggested by Schoenmaker and Wierts (2015), this 
is precisely what happened during the recent financial crisis, as the imbalances oc-
curring through excessive risk-taking or ‘too-big-to-fail’ effects made the overall 
financial system fragile. 
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Micro-prudential limitations may additionally arise from seemingly efficient 
implementations of micro-prudential supervision that might lead to adverse incen-
tives for agents, and hence work as potential destabilising factors. For instance, 
the introduction of complex model-based capital regulations was meant to adopt 
stronger risk management practices and increase the stability of the financial sector 
(Behn, Haselmann, & Vig, 2016). However, such regulation, along with a certain 
level of flexibility in model application, might lead to different unpredicted exter-
nalities, such as the adoption of more optimistic internal risk models by banks to 
bypass capital requirements, and thus potentially higher instability than expected 
(Colliard, 2014). 
These limitations have thus underlined the relevance of introducing a macro-
prudential approach in policies pursued by regulators. It is important to note, 
anyhow, that these two dimensions might complement each other, by addressing 
the risks that are usually not within the scope of their primary effect. For instance, 
micro-prudential supervision might be concerned with systemic risk factors, while 
a macro approach might involve particular attention to an individual risk factor 
for systemically important institutions (National Bureau of economic research, 
2012).
2. Macro-prudential policy and its challenges: market externalities
Putting macro-prudential policies in place does not, however, address all the 
systemic risk limitations of micro-prudential policies. One of the greatest challen-
ges to the effectiveness of macro-prudential policies is externalities. A formulation 
of externalities that fosters increases in systemic risk was first presented by Brun-
nermeier et al. (2009). For a detailed classification of externalities, see De Nicolò 
et al. (2012) (also Schoenmaker & Wierts [2011] and Claessens [2014]):
Strategic complementarities – a set of externalities that arise from the strategic 
choices of financial intermediaries, resulting in payoff increases for agents, as the 
number of those who undertake similar strategy increases. For instance, in an eco-
nomic boom, the competition between financial intermediaries tends to increase, 
creating favourable conditions for neglecting credit standards in the whole econo-
my (Claessens, 2014). Assuming imperfect information, the banks tend to reduce 
borrower screening, while increasing their lending capacity. eventually, this stra-
tegy may lead to unaccounted risks, which, in hand with the collective adoption 
of such a strategy, produce a destabilising force during downturns (Gorton & He, 
2008) (see also Ruckes [2004] and Dell’Ariccia & Marquez [2006]). 
Another angle regarding potential aspects of strategic complementarities is re-
presented by the interaction of reputational challenges and bank managers’ incen-
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tive structures. when managers care about the perception of their abilities vis-à-
vis the market, their credit policies might be influenced by those of other banks 
(Rajan, 1994). By copying each other’s behaviour, banks tend to assume that the 
recognition of failure would be more lenient if all the other market players act in 
the same way, creating some form of cooperative strategy, when the consequences 
of excessive risk-taking do not leave any other option (Allen & Saunders, 2003). 
Institutional supervision may also cause such externalities. These may be cau-
sed by either market-to-market (fair value accounting) or requirements to use si-
milar Value-at-Risk models or behavioural models (Claessens, 2014). The latter 
include potential investment opportunism, by neglecting the possibility of large 
shocks, or being sensitive to system-wide exposure (for this, see also Barberis 
[2013], Shleifer [2000] and Gennaioli et al. [2013]).
Finally, central banks acting as lenders of last resort generate incentive mecha-
nisms for banks to align their risk strategies, and consequently undertake riskier 
projects (Acharya & Yorulmazer, 2007) (see also Farhi & Tirole [2012] and Dam 
& Koetter [2011] for a game theory-based model).
The above-mentioned externalities, as a consequence, might impact bank asset 
quality, create additional sources of maturity and exchange mismatches, and gen-
erate an overall imbalance of the financial system (Allen & Carletti, 2011).
Fire sales – and credit crunches represent externalities that result in panic on 
financial markets in the form of sudden asset liquidation at a time when potential 
buyers are also troubled (De Nicolò et al., 2012). In these circumstances, asset 
prices drop drastically, making it even more challenging for investors to obtain 
liquidity, which is scarce (Allen & Gale, 1994). 
In such scenarios, contagion effects take place, with similar assets held by other 
market participants also declining in value, possibly resulting in fire sales (Shleifer 
& Vishny, 1992 and 2011). Hence, such a self-reinforcing chain effect of declines 
in value eventually leads to downward spirals for the net worth of other market 
participants as well (Brunnermeier & Pedersen, 2007). This, therefore, would po-
tentially increase the systemic risk, and might lead to financial market crashes. 
Banks that hold such assets experience a deterioration in their balance sheets, 
and might therefore cut their lending, making collaterals less valuable. This, con-
sequently, might limit final borrowers’ capacity to borrow, worsening the real 
economy (Goldstein et al., 2013).
Despite fire sales and credit crunch externalities appearing during downturns, 
a build-up of such risks and imbalances is usually generated during times of eco-
nomic expansion (De Nicolò et al., 2012). As market players take asset prices as 
given individually, they do not anticipate and internalise potential externalities 
linked to fire sales on future borrowing, leading to overborrowing, and potentially 
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distorting asset prices and causing excessive leverage (Caballero & Krishnamur-
thy, 2003; 2004; Stein, 2012; Manconi et al., 2012).
3. A second kind of challenge to macro-prudential policy: interbank linkages
Externalities related to banking interconnectedness – macro-prudential policies 
face challenges linked to another class of externalities, namely those associated 
with increasing systemic risk due to the tight interconnectedness of the banking 
system, and its dependency on strategies and the health of competitors. 
One of the main characteristics of banks in acting as financial intermediary is 
maturity transformation, which implies that they face a mismatch between issuing 
long-term loans financed by short-term deposits. Banks may access interbank len-
ding markets and balance out a temporal shortage of liquidity, thus reducing the 
risk of distress (Diamond & Dybvig, 1983). Nonetheless, exposure towards other 
banks might lead to an additional channel of contagion in the economy (Sarlin, 
2014). This phenomenon is widely discussed in the Allen & Gale (2000) model, 
indicating that even a small liquidity shock in one particular region can instantly 
spill over to the overall financial system through interbank exposure. When one 
region is suffering from financial turmoil, the rest of the system may face a loss in 
the form of a drop in the value of claims (Allen & Gale, 2000). If the effect of the 
spill-over is strong enough, it leads to the financial instability of other regions via 
a contagion effect, as the authors suggest.
Bank spill-overs can also appear because of price movements, as in cases of fire 
sales and because of the feedback effects from the aggregated economy (Bebchuk 
& Goldstein, 2011). While banks may pursue different strategies in order to redu-
ce the risks associated with interconnectedness, these risks cannot be eliminated 
entirely.
Until recently, the traditional literature on bank runs and systemic failures did 
not factor bank interconnectedness and their heterogeneity into the models. For 
instance, the seminal diamond-dybvig model investigates the role of banks as 
providers of liquidity to the economy by allowing depositors with heterogenous 
consumption time-preferences to maximise their utility in a multi-period world, 
but assuming one representative bank. 
relaxing the assumption of homogenous banks in the economy may provide 
insights into whether and how it might affect depositors’ reaction to a shock, and 
hence the extent to which it can spread across the system (Saez & Shi, 2004). This 
approach, while still explaining how bank runs may occur, eliminates the issue of 
how a bank run on a single bank may spill over in a sector of heterogenous institu-
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tions, and/or across other markets. In order to address this limitation, some authors 
have suggested extensions to the diamond-dybvig model. 
Chen (1999) includes a multi-banking assumption, and allows for depositors to 
be either informed or uninformed on the condition of health of the banking sector, 
creating the possibility for those with informational advantages to withdraw depo-
sits first. With imperfect information and relying on conflicting information, unin-
formed depositors may generate a panic, and drive even healthy banks into trouble, 
fostering a spill-over effect in the whole system (Sarlin, 2014). Another extension 
of the diamond-dybvig model assuming the multi-banking environment was pre-
sented by (Temzelides, 1997), which investigated the frequency of bank panics, 
as well as the market structures able to reduce them. The author suggests that a 
decreasing number of banks increases the likelihood of a bank panic, also creating 
the real threat of contagion spreading not only regionally but also internationally.
Systemic importance, associated with the size of institutions, might also play a 
crucial role in resilience towards externalities related to interconnectedness (Cla-
essens, 2014). Such institutions, while in distress, might be less sensitive towards 
smaller financial turbulence than smaller institutions that might get into trouble. 
The recognition of systemically important institutions as too-big-to-fail may, howe-
ver, decrease their resilience by incentivising greater risk-taking and moral hazard 
in anticipation of government intervention in times of turmoil, and by relatively 
relaxing discipline among the creditors of such institutions (Flannery, 2009).
As events occurring to bigger banks may affect the system, and in particular 
smaller banks, similarly, in the case of financial systems of different sizes and great 
interconnectedness, turbulence can easily be transmitted from a bigger market to 
the smallest. In this sense, smaller markets might become dependent on economic 
fluctuations in the bigger markets. 
Empirical evidence from cross-border banking supports the potential effects on 
stability linked to the presence of foreign-owned banks. For instance, the evidence 
suggests that foreign banks might have a stabilising effect on aggregate lending 
in times of financial distress (in Peek & Rosengren, 2000; Goldberg, Dages, & 
Kinney, 2000; García Herrero & Martínez Pería, 2007). More recent research by 
De Haas & Van Lelyveld (2006 and 2010) supports the idea of the positive effects 
of cross-border banking, suggesting that the existence of internal capital markets 
might serve as an emergency channel for liquidity in times of financial distress in 
a host country where the holding bank has subsidiaries. 
However, if the bank’s domestic market experiences a shortage of liquidity, it is 
likely that such a need would be covered at the expense of the host country. Assu-
ming that the cross-border banks residing in a relatively small market are homoge-
nous according to one attribute or another, capital withdrawal might cause a threat, 
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increasing systemic risk. Empirical evidence from different geographical areas, 
such as the effects of the Japanese crisis on US credit markets between 1989 and 
1996, discussed in Peek & Rosengren (2000), the case of the USA between 2007 
and 2009 presented in Cetorelli & Goldberg (2013), or the case of Russia from 
1992 to 2000 in Schnabl (2012), registers the negative spill-over effects through 
the above-mentioned interconnection channels.
While papers such as those by De Haas & Van Lelyveld (2006 and 2010) alre-
ady shed a light on the relevance of cross-border banking externalities, it appears 
that from both a policymaking and an academic perspective, the topic still remains 
open to more detailed research and discussion. 
4. Prudential policy tools and implications 
The implementation of macro-prudential policies has been a recent develop-
ment of post-financial crisis advanced economies. In 2013, the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (SSM) conferred the task of formalising prudential policies for credit 
institutions on the European Central Bank (ECB) (European Central Bank, 2019). 
Nonetheless, the setting and implementation of macro-prudential measures, as 
well as the formal establishment of the measures themselves, remained primarily 
in the hands of the national authorities, subject to notification to the ECB. 
A lack of a structural approach in defining macro-prudential policies to mitigate 
the externalities discussed in this paper still persists. As proposed by De Nicolò et 
al. (2012), most of these externalities might be addressed by implementing capital 
requirements that are already set by traditional micro-prudential regulation. How-
ever, such tools should not be perceived only as a means to resolve agency con-
flicts within the banks, but rather to tackle the externalities arising from banks 
(Claessens, 2014). Therefore, the interpreted measures need to be dependent on 
aggregated values representing the behaviour of all the banks, rather than follow-
ing an institution-specific approach, such as the one pursued by micro-prudential 
policies. Time-varying capital requirements were addressed by the Basel accords, 
where the latest, in 2011, suggested additional requirements linked to aggregated 
credit growth. The Eurozone equivalent of this approach is represented by the Cap-
ital Requirements Directive (CRD IV) regulatory tools (counter-cyclical, systemic 
risk buffers, etc), Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR) (risk weights for real es-
tate and intra-financial exposure, capital conservation buffer, own fund level), and 
other measures, such as setting a leverage ratio (European Central Bank, 2019). 
In addition, the ECB imposes borrower-based measures that include loan-to-value 
(LTV) or loan-to-income (LTI) caps. These measures affect the asset side of banks’ 
balance sheets, and are designed to avoid lower lending standards in times of eco-
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nomic success. As capital restrictions become less useful in good times, due to 
high profitability, tools such as LTV caps can complement them, by putting direct 
constraints on asset allocation (De Nicolò et al., 2012).
It is important to note, however, that some macro-prudential policies might con-
flict with micro-prudential intuition (De Nicolò et al., 2012). For instance, macro-
prudential capital requirements are constructed to be high in an economic boom, 
in order to avoid the accumulation of imbalances, while in a micro-prudential ap-
proach they tend to be low, as the risk of default is lower compared to a downturn. 
The same inconsistency might be observed in times of economic downturn, while 
from a macro-prudential perspective, capital regulation should be low in order 
to avoid fire sales and deleveraging, while a micro-prudential policy would re-
quire higher buffers, as banks need more equity to tackle an increase in defaults. 
Therefore, macro and micro approaches should be aligned or not depending on the 
goal set, for pursuing a macro approach may cause individual banks to experience 
increases in instability; while focusing solely on a micro approach might cause a 
deleveraging spiral at all system levels (Osiński, Seal, & Hoogduin, 2013). 
Incentivising banks to take preemptive measures during economic expansion 
can include capital requirements, liquidity requirements and taxation (Claessens, 
2014). These measures allow advance preparation for potential downturns, miti-
gating incentives for excessive risk taking in upturns. when applied to systemi-
cally important banks, this would, in turn, help minimise the risk of contagion and 
prevent spill-over across banks.
It is important to note, however, that these measures would be hard to calibrate, 
as it is challenging to determine an institution’s contribution, by being systemically 
important, to systemic risk as such (International Monetary Fund, 2010). Addition-
ally, labelling institutions as systemically important might lead to a lack of market 
discipline, as creditors and the bank itself would perceive themselves as ‘too-big-
to-fail’ and less risky. 
Another set of tools to deploy in order to reduce the risk arising from ‘too-
big-to-fail’ banks, as discussed by Claessens (2014) and De Nicolò et al. (2012), 
includes restrictions on asset composition and Pigouvian taxes, pushing systemi-
cally important institutions to internalise the systemic risk. It would, however, be 
hard to calibrate the specific volume of the risk that such an institution would cre-
ate, while again potentially relaxing banks’ discipline by the identification of such 
institutions (Kocherlakota, 2010). 
Taxation, nonetheless, may still help to strengthen banks’ resilience, and reduce 
the risk of negative interbank spill-overs. Perotti & Suarez (2011) propose im-
posing a tax that would compensate the maturity mismatch between banks’ long-
term investment and short-term funding, which would decrease the dependence 
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on short-term funding. De Nicolò et al. (2012) highlight the fact that even though 
Basel III tries to address this issue through the use of the liquidity ratio (like the 
ECB through CRR tools), taxes are easier to adjust to reflect the price difference 
between stable and unstable funding. In addition, taxation can be more flexible 
during turmoil, especially once banks have no choice but to comply with minimal 
liquidity benchmarks, or to accept less stable funding. However, as fiscal policies 
remain at a state level, and are used as a political tool to get a consensus, the imple-
mentation of these measures appears to be challenging. 
5. The challenges of systemic risk measurement
The implementation of effective macro-prudential policies also clashes with 
how systemic risk can be perceived. In this situation, the academic literature su-
ggests a variety of measurements and modelling frameworks in order to tackle 
specific challenges. One of the best-known measurements is CoVar, proposed by 
Adrian & Brunnermeier (2011). This indicator is based on Value-at-Risk (VaR) 
applied to a stressed financial system. The difference between CoVar and uncon-
ditional VaR determines the individual contributions of institutions to systemic 
risk. Similar measurements proposed by Acharya et al. (2010) and Huang et al. 
(2010) are also based on CoVar; however, these measurements do not differentiate 
between the size of systemic events by weighing their magnitude, but only suggest 
them being bivariate. These approaches, nonetheless, might proxy externalities 
related to interconnectedness in line with stress tests (Brunnermeier et al., 2010) 
and forward-looking risk indicators (Gray & Jobst, 2011). 
The externalities produced by strategic complementarities or imbalances le-
ading to fire sales may be proxied by measures of property prices, risk premia, 
deviations/gaps from trends in credit-to-GDP ratio, or leverage (De Nicolò et al., 
2012) (for this, see also Drehmann et al. [2011], Dell’Ariccia et al. [2012]). These 
measurement tools, however, may capture multiple externalities at the same time, 
thus leading to policies with potentially conflicting objectives (De Nicolò et al., 
2012). Another relevant limitation regarding systemic risk measurement is that ef-
ficient proxies are hard to calibrate, such as, for example, determining the optimal 
level of loan-to-value measurements or effective capital requirements (Crowe et 
al., 2011). Therefore, quantitative analyses aiming at measuring the effectiveness 
of macro-prudential policy tools need to be complemented by qualitative analyses 
that would help to set the perimeters and the main goals of the policies pursued.
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Conclusions 
The recent financial crisis fuelled a significant amount of attention and concern 
for prudential regulatory practices. It underlined the potential inability of micro-
prudential measures to ensure stand-alone financial stability. Only recently, the 
first attempts to formalise macro-prudential policy and its tools have taken place, 
shedding a light on disputable aspects of both supervision and the policy itself. 
Therefore, this paper aims to contribute by providing a structured approach to the 
topic of macro-prudential policy by concluding that:
1. Micro and macro-prudential policies differ in their objective, focus and per-
ception of the risk, as is suggested by Borio (2003). A macro-prudential 
approach aims to limit episodes of financial distress by addressing its cost to 
the economy and losses caused by financial institutions collectively, while 
micro-prudential policies concentrate on addressing the risk of the failure of 
specific individual institutions, as well as the costs associated with it. Con-
sequently, a macro-prudential policy perceives the risk as endogenous, as-
suming that institutions collectively may affect the prices of financial assets 
and quantities, and thus affect the state of the economy. A micro-prudential 
policy, on the other hand, would not consider such a feedback effect, and 
perceives the systemic risk as exogenous.
2. A macro-prudential policy might be approached by means of externalities 
that could potentially contribute to increasing systemic risk levels. This 
approach was suggested by De Nicolò et al. (2012), and includes exter-
nalities related to strategic complementarities, fire sales and interconnec-
tedness. This approach, however, is especially useful in understanding and 
evaluating the potential effects of macro-prudential policy and the impact of 
clustering policy by addressing these groups of externalities.
3. Interbank linkages may work as a contagion channel transmitting turmoil 
from one region to another. The theoretical model suggested by Allen & 
Gale (2000) shows that even a small liquidity shock in one particular region 
can instantly spill over to the overall financial system through interbank 
exposure. empirical studies on cross-border banking emphasise the poten-
tial effects on financial systems through interbank linkages, underlining the 
importance of such channels. Finally, the effects of interconnection are of 
great interest to small open economies, especially those dominated mainly 
by homogenous banks. 
4. The perception of the evaluation of prudential policy might also be appro-
ached through externalities. Along with traditional methods of capital requi-
rements that are already in use, it is necessary to highlight the importance 
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of its systemic view. But micro and macro-prudential policies may have 
different goals when it comes to the implementation of policy; therefore, it 
is vital to align these policies when approaching systemic risk. Finally, the 
measurement of the effects of prudential policy and the effectiveness of the 
tools appears to be a challenging task, leaving open the door to further aca-
demic research and discussion.
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A p p e n d i x  1
Table 1. A comparison of the micro-prudential and macro-prudential approach
Macro-prudential Micro-prudential
Proximate objective limit financial system-wide 
distress
limit distress of individual insti-
tutions
Ultimate objective avoid output (GdP) costs consumer (investor/ depositor) 
protection
Characterisation of risk seen as dependent on col-
lective behaviour (‘endog-
enous’)
seen as independent of individual 
agents’ behaviour (‘exogenous’)
Correlations and com-
mon exposures across 
institutions
important irrelevant
Source: Borio (2003)
